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Reinoud Joosten, Robin Meijboomy
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Abstract
We introduce a stochastic game in which transition probabilities
depend on the history of the play, i.e., the playerspast action choices.
To solve this new type of game under the limiting average reward crite-
rion, we determine the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards
which can be supported by equilibria involving threats.
We examine the following setting for motivational and expository
purposes. Each period, two agents exploiting a shery choose between
catching with restraint or without. The sh stock is in either of two
states, High or Low, and in the latter each action pair yields lower
payo¤s. Restraint is harmless to the sh, but it is a dominated strategy
in each stage game. Absence of restraint damages the resource, i.e.,
the less restraint the agents show, the higher the probablities that Low
occurs at the next stage of the play. This state may even become
absorbing, i.e., transitions to High become impossible.
JEL-Codes C72, C73, Q22, Q57
Keywords Stochastic games, endogenous transitions, limiting average
rewards, equilibria, common pool resource dilemma
1 Introduction
The main motivation of this paper is to incorporate certain empirical phe-
nomena of a stochastic nature into Small Fish Wars, i.e., a class of models
on the exploitation of a renewable natural resource featuring strategic inter-
action by multiple agents (cf., Joosten [2007a,b,c, 2010a]). One extension of
these Small Fish Wars leads to a new type of stochastic game.1
Corresponding author: FELab, School of Management & Governance, University of
Twente, POB 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands: r.a.m.g.joosten@utwente.nl
yDeloitte Accountants BV, Enterprise Risk Services, Laan van Kronenburg 2, 1183 AS
Amstelveen, The Netherlands.
1Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [1953]; for overviews and results see e.g.,
Vrieze [1987], Thuijsman [1992], Flesch [1998] and Vieille [2000a,b]. Amir [2003] connects
stochastic and di¤erence games in economic applications.
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A Small Fish War2 (Joosten [2007a]) has the following set-up. Two
agents possess the shing rights to a body of water, and they have essen-
tially two options, to sh with or without restraint. Restraint may take
various forms, e.g., catching seasons, quantities caught, catching methods,
or technologies, e.g., boats, nets, allowed in catching. Essential is that un-
restrained shing yields a higher immediate catch, but if continued, it may
damage the resource and therefore lead to decreasing catches in the future.
Restrained shing by both agents is sustainable in the long run.
In the standard version, agents wish to maximize their average catches
over an innite time-horizon. In such a setting, a tragedy of the commons
does not seem inevitable, as Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes can be sustained by
subgame perfect equilibria. Moreover, all equilibria yield rewards which are
well-above those connected to ruthless exploitation of the resource, because
a sizeable sh stock is preserved as time continues. The intuition behind this
is that catches, hence the stage payo¤s of the agents, are linked to the level
of the sh stocks and are therefore rather high on the long run. This results
in rewards being rather high as well. Ruthless exploitation of the resource
is good for immediate prots, yet prots will decline as time continues. As
a result their averages may become rather low.
In this paper we add randomness to a Small Fish War in three variants.
First, we introduce a simple form of stochasticity into the most simplied
version of the Small Fish War model. We take two states, High and Low,
and assume that there exist exogenously given transition probabilities to
move from one to the other, which do not depend on the actions taken by
the agents. This set-up determines also the long run transitions from High
to Low and vice versa and hence, the proportion of time the play spends
in either state, as well. Examples of this kind of stochasticity might be the
inuence of weather, climate, water temperatures, i.e., events (re)occurring
independently from actions the agents take.
In the second variant, the exogenously given transition probabilities de-
pends on the current state and actions chosen by the agents. Here, the
proportion of time the play spends in either state, may vary depending on
the actual play. In that sense, although the transition probabilities are xed,
the agents inuence the long run distribution of the play over the two states.
This type of stochasticity arises if the propensity of the system moving to
High depends on the current level of restraint on the part of the agents, as
well as on the current state. For instance, the same lack of restraint may be
more damaging to the resource if it is scarce than if it is abundant.
The third innovation is more fundamental. We introduce endogenous sto-
chastic variation, i.e., transition probabilities are inuenced by past catching
behavior of the agents. This extension is motivated by certain hysteresis ef-
2A word play on the title of the paper by Levhari & Mirman [1980] showing that
strategic interaction in a shery may induce a tragedy of the commons(Hardin [1968]).
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fects called poaching pits3 (e.g., Bulte [2003], Courchamp et al. [2006], Hall
et al. [2008]). We proceed with basically the same set-up as in the previ-
ous variants, but the more heavily the agents exploit the resource as time
continues, the worse its condition becomes. As a consequence, the proba-
bility of the system to move to High decreases in time in each state and
for each action combination. So, the play occurs more often in Low and
therefore, the catches of the agents will be low for a higher proportion of
time. To solve this new kind of game, we draw inspiration from earlier work
on Small Fish Wars, but also from Joosten, Peters & Thuijsman [1995],
Joosten [1996,2005], Thuijsman & Vrieze [1998], Joosten, Brenner & Witt
[2003], Schoenmakers et al. [2002] and Schoenmakers [2004].
For the setting to be presented and analyzed, the agents wish to maxi-
mize their long term average catches as in standard Small Fish Wars. In our
analysis we use an approach rather similar to the one in Joosten et al. [2003]
and provide the necessary proofs to validate these procedures in this new
setting. First, we prove that the rewards for any pair of jointly-convergent
pure strategies are easily established. Then, we determine the set of jointly-
convergent pure-strategy rewards. A more complex issue is then to nd for
each player the threat point reward, i.e., the highest amount this player can
obtain if his opponent tries to minimize his rewards. We nally obtain a
large set of rewards which can be supported by equilibria using threats.
We were able to reproduce e¤ects similar to the ones associated to a
poaching pit by Low (temporarily) becoming an absorbing state dependent
on the behavior of the agents. By a temporarily absorbing state we mean
that all transition probabilities from this state become zero temporarily. If
the agents keep overexploiting the resource, this situation will not change,
i.e., the transition probabilities mentioned remain zero. If the agents were to
adopt behavior permitting recovery of the resource, it may take some time
before transition probabilities to High become nonzero again.
In the model examined for expository purposes, the proportion of time
spent in such a poaching pit goes to zero in the long run in each subgame-
perfect equilibrium behavior. Exactly one equilibrium, no restraint, can be
associated to the poaching pit and, as mentioned, all other equilibria Pareto-
dominate it. To put it di¤erently, no subgame perfect equilibrium can be
associated with the poaching pit and precisely one equilibrium can. It is also
surprising that all jointly-convergent pure-strategies inducing the poaching
pit, yield lower combined rewards than no-restraint.
Next, we introduce the two models with exogenous and semi-exogenous
stochasticity. These models are fairly well-known in the analysis of stochastic
games. In Section 3, we focus on strategies and rewards in a very general
3One characteristic of a poaching pit is that if the system is forced into critically low
densities by overexploitation, it may take a rather long time before the resource recovers
after a program of rehabilitation is adopted.
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sense in order to prepare for the sequel. In Section 4, we present our model
with completely endogenous transition probabilities. Section 5 continues the
analysis for the models introduced in order to present sets of equilibrium
rewards. Section 6 concludes.
2 (Semi-)exogenous variability in catch sizes
A Small Fish War is played by players A and B at discrete moments in
time called stages. Each player has two actions and at each stage t 2 N
the players independently and simultaneously choose an action. Action 1
denotes the action for which some restriction exists allowing the resource
to recover, e.g., catching with wide-mazed nets or catching a low quantity.
Action 2 for player A (B) denotes the action without or with very little
restraint, e.g., catching with ne-mazed net or catching a high quantity. In
the following subsections, we treat two extensions of the Small Fish War
model staying within the framework o¤ered by stochastic game theory.
2.1 Exogenous variability
For the sake of simplicity we assume catches only to vary due to stochastic
shocks, which we model by means of a stochastic game with two states,
High and Low. Let the payo¤ matrices in the two states be given by
H =
2664

1
p0H
 
2
p0H


3
p0H
 
4
p0H

3775 and L =
2664

5
p0L
 
6
p0L


7
p0L
 
8
p0L

3775 :
Here, subscript H (L) indicates the payo¤matrix to be associated with state
High (Low). The catches in Low are half the size of the catches in High for
every pair of actions chosen. Each entry of the two matrices consists of a
vector having an ordered pair on top and a probability vector at the bottom.
The ordered pair denotes the payo¤s to the players if the corresponding
action pair is chosen, the rst (second) number is the payo¤ to player A
(B). The probability vector signies that the system moves to the respective
states for the next stage, where the rst (second) probability is connected
to High (Low). So, if the play is in state High and the players choose action
pair (1; 2), the payo¤ is 2 =
 
A2 ; 
B
2

, i.e., player A receives A2 ; player B
gets B2 and the play continues next according to p
0
H = (pH ; 1  pH) ; i.e., in
High (respectively Low) with probability pH (respectively 1  pH).
In the sequel, we assume that in both states Action 1 is dominated by
the alternative. This places the following restrictions on parameters above:
A1  A3 ; A2  A4 ; A5  A7 ; A6  A8 ;
B1  B2 ; B3  B4 ; B5  B6 ; B7  B8 :
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Here, the action pair chosen is not of any inuence on the transition prob-
abilities. Moreover, the latter are identical in a given state. Assuming
pL; pH 2 (0; 1); which is su¢ cient to guarantee that neither of the states is
absorbing, we may compute the long-run probabilities of the play visiting
High respectively Low as
p =
pL
1  pH + pL respectively (1  p) =
1  pH
1  pH + pL :
Clearly, pH = pL implies pL = p: Since the transition probabilities from
one state to another for each stage, as well as the long run probability that
the play will occur in each state are completely out of the control by both
players, we call these variations exogenous.
As the transition probabilities do not depend on the actual choices of
the players at any stage, we can regard the game as an innite sequence of
one-shot games where nature decides whether the stage game is
1 2
3 4

or

5 6
7 8

:
Both one-shot games possess a pure strict Nash equilibrium (2; 2); an innite
repetition of this action pair at all stages yields long-run average payo¤s
converging top4 + (1  p) 8:
2.2 Semi-endogenous variability
To prepare for the sequel, we now assume that the transition probabilities do
depend in detail on the actual choices made by the players at that particular
stage and state. There exist eight di¤erent action pairs which may be chosen,
hence the above translates into
H =
2664

1
p01
 
2
p02


3
p03
 
4
p04

3775 and L =
2664

5
p05
 
6
p06


7
p07
 
8
p08

3775
So, if the agents choose action pair (1; 2) in High, they receive stage payo¤s
2 and p02 = (p2; 1  p2), i.e., the play continues in Low with probability
1 p2 next. For Small Fish Wars the following restrictions seem meaningful
1 > p1  p2 = p3  p4
p5  p6 = p7  p8 > 0
pi  pi+4 for i = 1; :::; 4:
We assume that two-sided full restraint causes less damage in both states
to the resource than if one player catches with restraint and his opponent
5
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catches without. Hence, the probability that during the next stage play is
in High if the rst case arises is larger than the corresponding probability in
the second case. This motivates p1  p2; p3 and p5  p6; p7. We also assume
that it does not matter which player catches with or without restraint, hence
the equalities p2 = p3 and p6 = p7: Furthermore, we assume that one player
catching without restraint is less harmful to the resource than two players
catching without restraint. Finally, the inequalities pi  pi+4 for i = 1; :::; 4;
hold because if the play is in Low, the system is assumed more vulnerable
to overshing than if the play is in High: Catching without restraint by
both players in Low for instance may make a transition to High less likely
than if the players were to choose the same action pair in High. We refer
to e.g., Kelly et al. [2006] for an empirical underpinning of these modeling
choices. Note that this framework is more general than the former, because
the inequalities are chosen such that the former is a special case of the latter.
Let us capture the past play by two matrices
QHt =

qt1 q
t
2
qt3 q
t
4

and QLt =

qt5 q
t
6
qt7 q
t
8

:
Here, e.g., qt1 is the relative frequency with which action pair top-left in
High has occurred during past play, and qt7 is the relative frequency of ac-
tion pair bottom-left in Low having occurred during past play. Given this
interpretation we must have
qt =
 
qt1; :::; q
t
8
 2 S7; for all t = 1; 2; :::;
where Sn denotes an n-dimensional unit simplex.
Assume that
lim
t!1QH
t =

q1 q2
q3 q4

and lim
t!1QL
t =

q5 q6
q7 q8

;
Then it must hold also that
P8
i=1 qi = 1: Furthermore, play jumped from
High to Low with a relative frequency of
P4
i=1 qi (1  pi) and from Low to
High with a relative frequency of
P8
i=5 qipi: If at least one of the transition
probabilities p1; :::; p4 is strictly smaller than one and at least one of the
transition probabilities p5; :::; p8 is strictly larger than zero, an additional
restriction on the system must hold, namely
4X
i=1
qi (1  pi) =
8X
i=5
qipi: (1)
If these matrices QHt and QLt converge for t ! 1, we may regard q =
(q1; :::; q8) as a stationary distribution over the choices of all action pairs
in both states. Not all such stationary distributionsare admissible as (1)
must be fullled.
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Example 1a First, we connect actual numbers to the pairs of stage payo¤s
received by the players.
H =
2664

(4; 4)
(p1; 1  p1)
   
7
2 ; 6

(p2; 1  p2)

  
6; 72

(p3; 1  p3)
   
11
2 ;
11
2

(p4; 1  p4)

3775 ;
L =
2664

(2; 2)
(p5; 1  p5)
   
7
4 ; 3

(p6; 1  p6)


3; 74
(p7; 1  p7)
 
11
4 ;
11
4
(p8; 1  p8)

3775 :
We now compare two strategy pairs. In the rst strategy pair, both players
use restraint at all stages of the play, and in the second one both players use
no-restraint at all stages of the play. Then, under the rst pair of strategies
the restriction above implies
q1(1  p1) = q5p5:
from which we derive q1 =
p5
1 p1+p5 : By analogy we nd for the second case
that q4 =
p8
1 p4+p8 : Under the assumptions made, q1 is precisely the long-run
probability that High occurs under perfect restraint, and q4 is the long-run
probability that Low occurs under total absence of restraint. It can be
conrmed under the restrictions imposed that q1  q4 since
q1   q4 = p5
1  p1 + p5  
p8
1  p4 + p8
=
p5 (1  p4 + p8)  p8 (1  p1 + p5)
(1  p1 + p5) (1  p4 + p8)
=
p5 (1  p4)  p8 (1  p1)
(1  p1 + p5) (1  p4 + p8) :
As p5  p8 and (1  p4)  (1  p1) ; this boils down to p5 (1  p4)  
p8 (1  p1)  0; hence the inequality q1  q4 is satised.
Observe that all transition probabilities are given exogenously, yet the long-
run probability that High (Low) occurs during the play depends crucially
on the strategy pair employed by the players. This is why we used the term
semi-endogenous variations in the title of this subsection. So, in the case of
full restraint in the example, the system spends more time in High than in
the case of no-restraint.
Example 1b To continue, let p1 = 0:8; p2 = p3 = 0:6; p4 = 0:3; p5 = 0:6;
p6 = p7 = 0:4 and p8 = 0:1: We nd then
q1 =
0:6
1  0:8 + 0:6 =
3
4
; q4 =
0:1
1  0:3 + 0:1 =
1
8
:
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So, under perfect restraint the play is six times more often in High than
under no-restraint. An interesting phenomenon now occurs if one compares
the long-term average payo¤s connected to these two qualitatively opposed
strategy pairs. These averages are of course given by:
q1(4; 4) + q5(2; 2) =
3
4
(4; 4) +
1
4
(2; 2) =

3
1
2
; 3
1
2

;
q4

11
2
;
11
2

+ q8

11
4
;
11
4

=
1
8

11
2
;
11
2

+
7
8

11
4
;
11
4

=

3
3
32
; 3
3
32

:
So, the strategy pair giving lower payo¤s to both players in every stage game
actually induces higher average payo¤s in the long run.
This example may serve to demonstrate that we already have the mak-
ings of a social dilemma of the social trap variety (cf., e.g., Cross & Guyer
[1980], see Komorita & Parks [1994] for an overview). The long-term aver-
age payo¤s associated with full restraint are higher than those connected to
no-restraint. So, despite the circumstance that no-restraint is the dominant
action for both players in each stage game, the continued use of this one-
shot-optimal action pair leads to lower average payo¤s in the long run than
perfect restraint does. Games with similar structures draw wide interest in
(political) economics, psychology, sociology and law.4
3 Strategies and rewards
The players receive an innite stream of stage payo¤s during the play, and
are assumed to wish to maximize their average rewards. For a given pair of
strategies (; ) ; player ks average reward, k = A;B; is given by
k (; ) = lim inf
T!1
1
T
TX
t=1
Rkt (; ) :
Let furthermore,  (; )   A (; ) ; B (; ). First, we focus on rewards
from strategies which are pure and jointly convergent. Then, we extend our
analysis to obtain larger sets of feasible rewards.
A strategy is pure, if at each stage a pure action is chosen, i.e., an
action is chosen with probability 1: The set of pure strategies for player k
is Pk, and P  PA  PB: Let us dene the following notions, introduced
before in a rather informal manner, a bit more formally. For j = 1; 2; dene
qtj =
#
n
jA;Hu ; j
B;H
u

= (1; j) j 1  u  t
o
t
;
4Cf., e.g., Olson [1965], Hamburger [1973], Platt [1973], Schelling [1978], Dawes [1980],
Liebrand [1983], Ostrom [1990], Ostrom et al. [1994] or Skyrms [2004]
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qtj+2 =
#
n
jA;Hu ; j
B;H
u

= (2; j) j 1  u  t
o
t
,
qtj+4 =
#
n
jA;Lu ; j
B;L
u

= (1; j) j 1  u  t
o
t
;
qtj+6 =
#
n
jA;Hu ; j
B;H
u

= (2; j) j 1  u  t
o
t
:
Here, jA;Xu (j
B;X
u ) denotes the action taken by player A (B) while being in
state X = H;L at stage u 2 f1; 2; :::; tg: So, for instance qt4 is the relative
frequency of action pair (2; 2) in state H being chosen until stage t: Hence,
qt   qt1; :::; qt8 2 S7 =
(
x 2 Rn+1+ j
8X
i=1
xi = 1
)
:
We refer to such a vector as the relative frequency vector. Moreover, for
vector q 2 S7, the q-averaged payo¤s (x; y)q are given by
(x; y)q =
8X
i=1
qii:
The strategy pair (; ) 2 XA XB is jointly convergent if and only
if q 2 S7 exists such that for all " > 0; i 2 f1; 2; :::; 8g :
lim supt!1 Pr;
qti   qi  " = 0: (2)
Pr; denotes the probability under strategy-pair (; ). J C denotes the
set of jointly-convergent strategy pairs. Under such a pair of strategies,
the relative frequency of each action pair in both states as play goes to
innity converges to a xed number with probability 1 in the terminology of
Billingsley [1986, p.274]). The set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy
rewards PJC is then the set of pairs of rewards obtained by using a pair
of jointly-convergent strategies.
The following result connects the notions introduced.
Proposition 1 Let strategy-pair (; ) 2 PJC and let q 2 S7 for which (2)
is satised, then the average payo¤s are given by  (; ) = (x; y)q:
Proof: Let (; ) 2 PJC and denote the pair of expected payo¤s received
at stage u under this strategy pair by Ef;u g; then
lim
t!1
1
t
tX
u=1
Ef;u g = lim
t!1E
(
1
t
tX
u=1
;u
)
=
9
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lim
t!1E
(
8X
i=1
qtii
)
= lim
t!1
8X
i=1
E

qti
	
i =
8X
i=1
qii = (x; y)q:
The second equality sign holds because it involves a change in counting:
on the left-hand side we sum over all periods, on the right-hand side over
all eight entries of the two bi-matrices weighed by their relative frequen-
cies. The rst and third equality are standard, the penultimate one follows
from (2), cf., e.g., Billingsley [1986, p.274], the nal one by the denition
given above. Since limt!1 1t
Pt
u=1Ef;u g equals (x; y)q, it follows that
 (; ) = (x; y)q:
We now show implications of this result for two variants of a Small Fish War,
namely one with exogenous and one with semi-endogenous stochasticity.
Figure 1: A sketch of all jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards in Exam-
ple 1a with p1 = ::: = p8 = 0:5: Matlab generated 90.000 of such rewards
randomly. The true set is dense.
Example 2 Figure 1 shows PJC , the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy
rewards, if, as in the case of Subsection 2.1, the transition probabilities are
exogenously given by pH = pL = 0:5. Please recall that in the long run
the system spends half of the time in High. Since the payo¤s in Low were
originally selected as being 50% of those in High, it may be seen readily
10
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that these rewards coincide with rewards being 75% (= 12  100%+ 12  50%)
of those if the game had only one state, namely High. This rather intu-
itive observation is far from generalizable to games with di¤erent choices of
transition probabilities, as we show next.
Figure 2: A sketch of PJC resembles a projection of a diamond for the case
p1 = 0:8; p2 = p3 = 0:6; p4 = 0:3; p5 = 0:6; p6 = p7 = 0:4; p8 = 0:1: Matlab
generated 50,000 of such rewards randomly. The true set is dense.
Figure 2 shows PJC for a case labeled as semi-endogenous variations
in Subsection 2.2. The transition probabilities for this numerical example
are given in the caption of the gure. As we have argued, the time the
play occurs in High depends crucially on the strategies the players employ,
despite the transition probabilities themselves do not change. Therefore,
also the rewards depend on those long run probabilities the play occurs in
either state.
For Figures 1 and 2 only the transition probabilities di¤er. The quadran-
gle of Figure 1 is distorted into a diamond shape by these di¤erent transition
probabilities. Note that the strategy pair consisting of always catching with
restraint yields
 
312 ; 3
1
2

; whereas no restraint yields
 
3 332 ; 3
3
32

as shown be-
fore. So, the quadrangle is folded inwards, so to speak, from the north east
as well as from the south west, such that the utmost south-western point
in the original ends up more to the north-east than the original utmost
north-eastern point.
11
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4 Endogenous transition probabilities
Central for the approach followed in this section is that we endogenize the
transition probabilities in the sense that we allow them to depend on past
play. To be a bit more precise, we take the transition probabilities as follows
pti = fi
 
qt

for all i = 1; :::; 8:
So, for instance, pt7 is the probability that the play moves to High at stage
t + 1 given that the players played action pair (2; 1) in Low at point t in
time given the history of the play captured by relative frequency vector qt:
The functions fi : Sn ! [0; 1] are assumed continuous for all i = 1; :::; 8.
Our motivation for this innovation stems from a desire to incorporate
empirically observed phenomena into Small Fish Wars. One striking ob-
servation made in real-life renewable resource systems is that the resource
can be brought down in numbers (or quantity) rather quickly by overex-
ploitation. Yet, when more sound catching policies (strategies) are adopted
designed at restoring the resource, it takes quite long for the system to re-
cover to higher or full capacity.5 For this purpose, we design the new game
in such a matter that Low, which is not an absorbing state per se, may
become one if both agents use no-restraint for prolonged periods.
By absorbing state in this context, we mean that the system can not
move out of the state temporarily as opposed to more standard approaches
where absorbing means that the system can never escape. Now, the state
Low will be absorbing (in our sense) at stage t 2 N if
fi
 
qt

= 0 for all i = 5; :::; 8:
So, the values of all of the functions corresponding to action choices in Low
above must be zero at that point in time. Of course, if one of these values
becomes strictly positive again, the play may escape from this state if the
agents target the corresponding action pair. Assuming relative frequency
vectors exist for which Low is not absorbing, the agents must manipulate
the current relative frequency vector su¢ ciently close towards them. This
may take some time, and meanwhile only bad payo¤s occur.
We assume the following ranking to hold for all t 2 N:
1 > pt1  pt2 = pt3  pt4
pt5  pt6 = pt7  pt8  0
pti  pti+4 for i = 1; :::; 4:
Note that we have introduced one small but important di¤erence to the set-
up used in the previous sections, as we do not exclude anymore that Low
5Cf., e.g., Tegner [1992], Hutchings [2000], Russ & Alcala [1996, 2003], Bulte [2003],
Kelly et al. [2006], Courchamp et al. [2006], Hall et al. [2008]). Another well-known
low-density phenomenon, the Allee E¤ect, was modeled in Joosten [2007b,c, 2010].
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becomes an absorbing state (temporarily). Otherwise, we assume the same
ordinal ranking of the transition probabilities to hold as before, but now,
since they can change, for any t 2 N.
Example 3a Let for given relative frequency vector qt 2 S7, the transition
functions fi; i = 1; :::; 8; governing the transition probabilities, be given by
pt1 = f1(q
t) =

1
2   1124qt4   1112qt8

+
pt2 = f2(q
t) = pt3 = f3(q
t) =

1
2   1120qt4   1110qt8

+
pt4 = f4(q
t) =

1
2   1116qt4   118 qt8

+
pt5 = f5(q
t) =

1
2   1112qt4   116 qt8

+
pt6 = f6(q
t) = pt7 = f7(q
t) =

1
2   118 qt4   114 qt8

+
pt8 = f8(q
t) =

1
2   114 qt4   112 qt8

+
:
Here, [x]+ is short-hand for maxfx; 0g. These equations capture the fol-
lowing ideas. If the shermen were never to interfere in the sh stock, the
probability that the play at any stage is in Low (High) equals 12 . However,
the catching behavior of the agents may have consequences for the proba-
bilities of both states occurring during the play. Only unrestrained catching
by both agents damages the resource. In Low, the e¤ects of combined unre-
strained catching are more detrimental to the transition probabilities than
in High.
Suppose both agents play action 1 twice followed by action 2 for a su¢ -
ciently long period of time. Clearly, qt4 + q
t
8 =
t 2
t ; hence for t large enough
f5
 
qt

= f6
 
qt

= f7
 
qt

= f8
 
qt

= 0; because
1
2
  11
12
qt4  
11
6
qt8 =
1
2
  11
12

t  2
t
  qt8

  11
6
qt8 =
1
2
  11
12

1  2
t
  qt8

  11
6
qt8 =  
5
12
+
11
6t
  11
12
qt8 < 0:
Then, f5
 
qt

= 0 and by the relation to the other transition probability
functions, f6
 
qt

= f7
 
qt

= f8
 
qt

= 0 as well. Take t = 5; clearly
  5
12
+
11
6t
  11
12
qt

8 < 0;
because even if the state Low did not materialize in the rst four periods,
hence qt

8 = 0, the part
11
6t is su¢ ciently small.
It should be noted that even if both agents switch to playing a pair of se-
quences of (1; 1; 1; :::) at some point t > t; it will take a while before f5
 
qt

becomes positive again.6 If the agents were to switch to a seemingly equally
harmlesspair of sequences alternating their actions in an anti-coordinating
6Shertzer & Prager [2006] point out that in real life delays regarding switching to stock
rebuilding measures in shery management are the rule rather than the exception.
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fashion, the play would eventually return to High again, but after a longer
period of time (in expectation) than under the pair of sequences (1; 1; 1; :::)
as f6
 
qt

and f7
 
qt

become strictly positive at an even later point in time.
While being in Low they receive a stream of stage payo¤s well below the
lowest stage payo¤ in High.
This example shows that one of the aspects of real-life resource systems
can be replicated to some degree, namely renewable resources recuperat-
ing slowly after a program of recovery has been taken up. The reason for
this may be in biological specics. For instance, it is well-known (cf., e.g.,
Kurlansky [1998]) that full-grown cod spawn a considerably higher number
of eggs than younger specimen. Oosthuizen & Daan [1974] nd that linear
fecundity-weight relations have highest statistical explanatory power. Arm-
strong et al. [2001] conrm these ndings and demonstrate that length has
rather poor correlation with fecundity. Rose et al. [2008] claim that fecun-
dity increases with size in an exponential manner. Despite these di¤erences,
these studies agree on big is beautifulwhen it comes to reproductive ca-
pacity. As mature, big sh are targeted and modern techniques such as gill
nets facilitate this, the e¤ects of overshing are mainly felt in the cohorts
most productive in providing o¤spring. For a species to regain full repro-
ductive capacity, younger cohorts must reach ages well-beyond adulthood.
This may take a considerable while.
For a pair of jointly-convergent pure strategies, i.e., a pair of strategies
such that (1) holds, we clearly have
pi  lim
t!1 p
t
i = lim
t!1 fi
 
qt

= fi(q) for i = 1; :::; 8:
Again this can be motivated by these functions being continuous, and the
strong property formulated in (1) (cf. e.g., Billingsley [1986]). The notation
introduced above generalizes the one used in the previous sections.
To establish PJC we distinguish the following three possibilities
4X
i=1
qi (1  pi) =
8X
i=5
qipi;
or
8X
i=5
qipi = 0;
or
4X
i=1
qi (1  pi) = 0:
The rst equation pertains to neither state being absorbing in the long run,
the second one to Low being an absorbing state in the long run, and the
nal one to High being absorbing. Observe that the three possibilities are
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mutually exclusive, since for q 2 S7; the underlying restriction is P8i=1 qi =
1: Now, the second equality can only hold if
pi = 0 or qi = 0 for all i = 5; :::; 8:
Similarly, the nal situation can only hold if
1  pi = 0 or qi = 0 for all i = 1; :::; 4:
So, if a state is absorbing, then positive mass on a component of the relative
frequency vector q can only occur if the associated probability of leaving that
state is zero.
Note that High can not be an absorbing state, but Low may very well
become one during the play. Clearly, if Low is absorbing it must hold that
8X
i=5
qi = 1:
Taking this fact and the ranking assumed together, we may distinguish the
following three subcases if Low is an absorbing state.
q8 = 1 and p6 = p7 > p8 = 0;
or
8X
i=6
qi = 1 and p6 = p7 = p8 = 0;
or
8X
i=5
qi = 1 and p5 = p6 = p7 = p8 = 0:
We will now demonstrate how the e¤ects mentioned may be replicated by a
stochastic game model with endogenous transition probabilities. Combined
unrestrained catching in Low is more damaging to the transition probabili-
ties to High than the same behavior does in High.
Example 3b The set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards depends
crucially on whether Low is an absorbing state or not. Let (; ) be a pair of
jointly-convergent pure strategies and let q satisfy (2). Then, the equation
4X
i=1
qi (1  fi(q)) =
8X
i=5
qifi(q) and f8(q) > 0
places easy to check restrictions on the system for the case that Low is not
absorbing. For the case that it is, we must distinguish three subcases. Low
is an absorbing state i¤ one of the following three conditions are fullled:
q8 = 1 and
1
2
  11
4
q4   11
2
q8  0 < 1
2
  11
8
qt4  
11
4
qt8;
or
8X
i=6
qi = 1 and
1
2
  11
8
q4   11
4
q8  0 < 1
2
  11
12
qt4  
11
6
qt8;
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or
8X
i=5
qi = 1 and
1
2
  11
12
q4   11
6
q8  0:
Observe that q4 > 0 yields a contradiction. Hence, the above reduces to
q8 = 1 and
1
11
 q8  2
11
;
or
8X
i=6
qi = 1 and
2
11
 q8  3
11
;
or
8X
i=5
qi = 1 and q8  3
11
:
Clearly, the rst of three cases yields a contradiction, so there exists actually
not a single relative frequency vector q 2 S7 leading to the situation that
Low is an absorbing state such that only f8(q) = 0: The second implies
that q5 = 0 and 124  q8  120 : For q8  120 , all other relative frequencies
q5; :::; q7 may be non-zero as well and simultaneously fulll the criteria under
which Low is an absorbing state. In Figure 3 we have depicted the sets of
admissible relative frequency vectors consistent with the case that the state
Low is an absorbing state.
e
e
e
5
6
7
e8
(0,0,8/11,3/11)
(0,0,9/11,2/11)
(0,8/
11,0
,3/11
) (0,9/11,0,2/11)
(8/11,0,0,3/11)
Figure 3: If Low is absorbing, all mass is on q5; :::; q8: We depict S3: a facet
of S7; each point in S3 corresponds to an admissible vector q. Extreme point
ei has element i equal to one. There are two sets of admissible qs, sketched
here as a 3-dimensional set, and a 2-dimensional boundary set.
Obviously, such a reduction of possible relative frequency vectors has
consequences on the rewards which can be obtained under the assumption
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that the strategies involved make Low an absorbing state. Figure 4 depicts
all jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards if Low is an absorbing state and
the relative frequency vectors are admissible. Note that the set of rewards
obtained is not convex.
(11/4,11/4)
(2,2)
(7/4,3)
(3,7/4)
(2.56,2.56)
  (85/44,141/44)
(89/44,129/44)
(129/44,89/44)
( 141/44,85/44)
Figure 4: The parallellogram corresponds to 3-dimensional set, the trapez-
ium to the 2-dimensional boundary set of admissible qs.
A second component of the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy re-
wards is also determined quite easily, namely those consistent with strate-
gies where mutual no-restraint is avoided. Since this leads to q4 = q8 = 0;
it follows that with respect to the transition probabilities, we have:
fi(q) =
1
2
for all i = 1; :::; 8:
It can be conrmed that the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards
corresponding to relative frequency vector with q4 = q8 = 0 is given by
conv

(3; 3) ;

18
4
;
21
8

;

21
8
;
18
4

:
Here, conv S denotes the convex hull of set S.
The remaining jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards are depicted in
Figure 5. The gure was generated in Matlab. As the program only gen-
erates a large but nite number of points representing jointly-convergent
pure-strategy rewards, the set does not appear dense at the present set-
tings. The true set is dense and we could make it look as such by adjusting
the parameters. However, presently the two sets described show up clearly,
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Figure 5: The set PJC for Examples 3a and 3b. The hexagon and the
triangle discussed, can be distinguished clearly. The area in between cor-
responds to rewards obtained by strategy-pairs with positive weight on the
two action-pairs damaging the resource.
an e¤ect lost if the gure were to be made more dense. It turns out that the
space in between the two subsets elaborated on, is lled by the remaining
jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards.
5 On equilibrium rewards
We will now focus on rewards which may be obtained by equilibria involving
threats. The approach to be followed is similar to a well-established one in
the repeated games literature (cf., e.g., Hart [1985], Forges [1986]), where it
is linked to the Folk Theorem (see e.g., Van Damme [1992]). Applications
of this approach to stochastic games exist as well (cf., e.g., Thuijsman &
Vrieze [1998], Joosten et al. [2003], Schoenmakers [2004], Joosten [1996,
2005, 2007a,b]), but they have attracted much less following than in the
branch of literature mentioned.
We call v =
 
vA; vB

the threat point, where vA = min2XB max2XA
A(; ); and vB = min2XA max2XB B(; ): So, vA is the highest amount
A can get if B tries to minimize As average payo¤s. Under a pair of in-
dividually rational (feasible) rewards each player receives at least the
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threat-point reward. We can now present the following formal result.
Theorem 2 Let E be the set of all individually-rational jointly-convergent
pure-strategy rewards. Then, each pair of rewards in E can be supported by
an equilibrium.
Proof: Let p (p) be a punishment-strategy of player A (B), i.e., a strategy
holding his opponent to at most v2 (v1). Let (x; y) 2 E, then (; ) 2 PJC
exists such that  (; ) = (x; y)   v1; v2 : Dene (; ) by
t =

t if jk = k for all k < t;
pt otherwise.
t =

t if ik = k for all k < t;
pt otherwise.
Here, it and jt denote the actions taken by player A respectively B at stage
t of the play. Clearly,  (; ) =  (; ) = (x; y) : Suppose Player 1 were
to play 0 such that 0k 6= k for some k; then Player 2 would play accord-
ing to p from then on. Since, 1 (0; p)  v1  x, it follows immediately
that player A can not improve against : A similar statement holds in case
Player 2 deviates unilaterally. Hence, (; ) is an equilibrium.
The above is fairly standard in the analysis of repeated games, see e.g., Hart
[1985], Van Damme [1991], and elsewhere, e.g., Thuijsman & Vrieze [1998].
Such a pair of strategies (; ) is commonly referred to as an equilibrium
involving threats. The threat is that each player will punish the opponent
if the latter were to deviate from the equilibrium path.
In Joosten et al. [2003], we presented a technique to prove that the
convex hull of a set of E correspond to equilibria as well. The convexica-
tion is based on a communication round deciding on which of the equilibria
yielding a reward belonging to E is to be played from then on, see also Hart
[1985] and Forges [1986] on the issue of obtaining (convex) sets of equilib-
rium rewards. Using that technique it can be shown that the convex hull of
E is contained by the set of equilibrium rewards. With some mild generic-
ity assumptions it can be shown that except for Pareto-inferior boundaries
of this convex hull, this set can be supported by so-called subgame perfect
equilibria, cf., e.g., Joosten et al. [2003].
Next, we illustrate the notions introduced and Theorem 2.
Example 4a In the case underlying Figure 1, the threat point is given by
v =
 
vA; vB

=
 
33
8 ;
33
8

: This can be seen as follows. Suppose player A
plays the second action from a certain stage onwards. Then, player B faces
a rather simple problem from then on, he must choose between obtaining 72
and 112 in High, and between
7
4 and
11
4 in Low where each state occurs with
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probability 12 . So, B maximizes his reward by always choosing the second
action and the rewards must equal
1
2
 11
2
+
1
2
 11
4
=
33
8
:
So, vB  338 . Note furthermore that if player B were to play his second
action at every stage of the play, then player A can minimize his opponents
reward by choosing this action as well. Hence, player B has a strategy to
guarantee himself at least 338 ; so v
B  338 :
The analysis not only conrms our earlier statement about no-restraint being
an equilibrium, but we showed that it is the unique equilibrium. Existence
of multiple equilibria is not an exception as the next example shows.
Example 4b In the case underlying Figure 2, we have v =
 
vA; vB

= 
137
44 ;
137
44

: This can be seen as follows. Suppose player A plays the second
action from a certain stage onwards. Then, player B faces the following
maximization problem (cf., e.g., Hordijk et al. [1983], Blackwell [1962]):
max
q3;q4;q7;q8
7
2
q3 +
11
2
q4 +
7
4
q7 +
11
4
q8
s.t. 1 = q3 + q4 + q7 + q8
0 =
4
10
q3 +
7
10
q4   4
10
q7   1
10
q8
0  q3; q4; q7; q8:
From the linearity of this problem it follows immediately that it su¢ ces
to examine the four situations in which one of two frequencies in High is
maximal combined with one of two frequencies in Low is maximal. The
solution is q7 = 711 and q4 =
4
11 ; and the Bs reward is
4
11  112 + 711  74 = 13744 :
So, vB  13744 :
Suppose player B uses his rst action in Low and his second action
in High. To minimize his opponents reward, Player A faces the following
minimization problem (cf., e.g., Hordijk et al. [1983], Blackwell [1962]):
min
q3;q4;q7;q8
6q2 +
11
2
q4 + 2q5 +
7
4
q7
s.t. 1 = q2 + q4 + q5 + q7
0 =
4
10
q2 +
7
10
q4   6
10
q5   4
10
q7
0  q2; q4; q6; q8:
The solution is q7 = 711 and q4 =
4
11 : So, v
B  13744 : Therefore, player B
has a strategy guaranteeing him at least this amount no matter what his
opponent does, whereas the latter has a strategy by which he can keep his
opponent to at most the same amount. Hence, vB = 13744 :
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Figure 6: All jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards located above and
to the right of the two red lines through
 
137
44 ;
137
44

can be supported by an
equilibrium strategy using threats.
The twice-quoted result of Hordijk et al. [1983] states that a pure sta-
tionary strategy su¢ ces as a best reply against a xed stationary strategy.
Any pair of stationary strategies here is clearly jointly-convergent. For the
case in which the transition probabilities are endogenous on past play, the
linear programs will not be su¢ cient as we demonstrate next.
Example 4c. In the case underlying Figure 5, we have v =
 
vA; vB

=
(2:75; 2:75) : This can be seen as follows. Suppose player A plays the second
action from a certain stage onwards. By the results of Hordijk et al. [1983]
a pure stationary strategy su¢ ces for player B to maximize his rewards. So,
player B faces the following problem
max
q3;q4;q7;q8
7
2
q3 +
11
2
q4 +
7
4
q7 +
11
4
q8
s.t. 1 = q3 + q4 + q7 + q8
0 = (1  f3)q3 + (1  f4)q4   f7q7   f8q8
f3 =

1
2
  11
20
q4   11
10
q8

+
f4 =

1
2
  11
16
q4   11
8
q8

+
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f7 =

1
2
  11
8
q4   11
4
q8

+
f8 =

1
2
  11
4
q4   11
2
q8

+
0  q3; q4; q7; q8:
Despite the linearity of the objective function, we do not have an LP -
problem anymore, because the second restriction becomes nonlinear due
to the four restrictions following it. We will not give all the computations
here, because they are lengthy and rather tedious. There is no interior solu-
tion of the rst order conditions of an equivalent (transformed) problem. By
checking all boundary (local) solutions, we found the global solution q8 = 1;
the connected reward to player B is 2:75: This boils down to player B al-
ways using his second action: So, player A possesses a strategy to hold his
opponents rewards to this amount, hence, vB  2:75:
Assume player B uses the second action at all stages of the play. In order
to minimize his opponents rewards, player A faces the following problem
min
q2;q4;q6;q8
6q2 +
11
2
q4 + 3q6 +
11
4
q8
s.t. 1 = q2 + q4 + q6 + q8
0 = (1  f2)q2 + (1  f4)q4   f6q6   f8q8
f3 =

1
2
  11
20
q4   11
10
q8

+
f4 =

1
2
  11
16
q4   11
8
q8

+
f7 =

1
2
  11
8
q4   11
4
q8

+
f8 =

1
2
  11
4
q4   11
2
q8

+
0  q3; q4; q7; q8:
Clearly, q8 = 1 yields rewards equal to 114 ; all other feasible rewards involve
q8 < 1 yielding a reward strictly higher than 114 : So, v
B = 2:75:
6 Conclusions
We have expanded the framework of Small Fish Wars introduced in Joosten
[2007a] and extended in Joosten [2007b,c, 2010a] by allowing stochasticity
in the transition structure. We investigated three variants of randomness
with increasing generality. The rst one deals with transition probabilities
which do not depend on the actions taken by the agents, but may depend
on the state the system is in currently. The second variant treats transition
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Figure 7: All jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards to the north-eastof
the two red lines can be supported by an equilibrium using threats. These
equilibrium rewards can only be obtained if the agents use the action-pairs
damaging the resource rarely.
probabilities depending on the actions taken by both agents and on the
current state. These two variants are new for Small Fish Wars, yet fairly
standard in the theory of stochastic games.
The third innovation however, is novel not only with respect to Small
Fish Wars, but extends stochastic games into a new dimension. We allow
the transition probabilities to depend on the actions taken by the agents, on
the current state and on the history of the play until then. To the best of
our knowledge, this aspect has not been examined before in the literature.
The inspiration for these innovations of the Small Fish Wars framework
are mainly empirical. The rst addition of randomness can be used to model
the inuence on the sh stock of weather, seasons, climate, water tempera-
tures, or other random events beyond the control of the agents and without
any relation to their catching behavior. The second innovation can addition-
ally capture the inuence of the playersbehavior on the resource, especially
di¤erentiating between future e¤ects on the sh stock of overshing during
periods of abundance and periods of scarcity. With this variant it is possi-
ble to induce a so-called social dilemma of the social trap type. The latter
constitutes an empirical phenomenon which is far from exceptional in the
exploitation of common pool resource systems.7
7The observation that social dilemmas occur frequently in real-life common pool re-
source systems by no means implies that the tragedy of the commons is ubiquitous. On
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The third extension of Small Fish Wars with stochasticity allows to in-
corporate phenomena usually connected to low density of the resource. The
model links past catching behavior to current transition probabilities. We
allow that the state yielding bad outcomes becomes absorbing temporarily.
If such a case arises, even if the agents turn to exploitation policies which are
environmentally sound, it may take a non-trivial amount of time before the
rst transition to a state yielding higher outcomes occurs. In that manner
we capture a poaching pit or hysteresis (cf., e.g., Bulte [2003]).
We solve these three extensions of the Small Fish War framework with
methods introduced in Joosten, Brenner &Witt [2003] inspired by the litera-
ture on Folk Theorems for stochastic games e.g., Thuijsman & Vrieze [1998],
Joosten [1996,2005], Schoenmakers, Flesch & Thuijsman [2002] and Schoen-
makers [2004]. We obtain a continuum of rewards which can be supported
by equilibria involving threats.
The good news is that in all variants, a tragedy of the commonscan be
averted by su¢ ciently patient rational agents maximizing their utilities non-
cooperatively. Almost all equilibrium rewards yield more than the amounts
associated to the permanent ruthless exploitation of the resource. Pareto
optimal equilibrium rewards always correspond to strategy pairs involving a
considerable amount of restraint on the part of the agents and the associated
rewards are notably better than no-restraint rewards.
The circumstance that in the example featuring endogenous transition
probabilities which was analyzed rather completely for expository purposes,
the threat point coincides with the no-restraint rewards is remarkable, but
exceptional. In general this connection does not hold, in particular if the
stage payo¤s in Low are very small to the ones in High. It is also not generic
that the state Low becomes absorbing temporarily.
We wanted to present a fairly tractable model and to economize on
notations. Our rst measure was to keep the sh stock xed essentially
yet stochastic, i.e., the variation in stock sizes and catches is only due to
random e¤ects captured by the transition probabilities. With respect to
the original set-up of Small Fish Wars, i.e., with endogenous stage payo¤s,
we intend to combine the (possibly endogenous) stochastic e¤ects examined
and elaborated on here with changing sh stocks as in the original set-up.
Our second measure was to use three twos: two states, two players and
two actions. Two distinct states allow to model the kind of transitions we
had in mind. In order to capture additional phenomena observed in real-life
systems, such as seasonalities or other types of correlations, a larger number
of states may be required. Two agents are minimally required to model
strategic interaction. We did not take more agents because complexities
the contrary, many societies locked into social dilemmas have found multiple designs to
counteract the detrimental e¤ects of the system and selsh myopic behavior (cf., e.g.,
Ostrom et al. [1994], Janssen & Ostrom [2001]).
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in notation and representation arise, hardly justied by an added value.
We used symmetry out of e¢ ciency considerations. Another self-imposed
limitation was the rather low number of stage-game actions. For applied
work, more levels or dimensions of restraining measures may be necessary.
For instance, when considering three types of nets, two types of boats, two
options for the duration of shing seasons combined with three levels of
quota as measures for sustainable management of the resource, 36 actions
would be a logical consequence. Adding states, (asymmetric) players or
actions changes nothing to our approach conceptually.
The type of agent that we regard as being modeled, is not the individual
sherman, but rather countries, regions, villages or cooperatives of sher-
men. It is debatable whether the latter types care for the future su¢ ciently
to induce sustainability (see e.g., Ostrom [1990], Ostrom et al. [1994] for op-
timistic views), but individual shermens preferences seem too myopic (cf.,
e.g., Hillis & Wheelan [1994]). In Joosten [2007b], we briey treat myopic
time preferences as well, Joosten [2010b] discusses various social dilemmas
arising within one and the same Small Fish War due to di¤erent levels of
patience of the agents.
A modeling choice later on will be whether to model Allee e¤ects with
the set-up used in Joosten [2007b,c, 2010a] or with the present one. Adding
a third state to the system which has only in-going transitions beyond a
certain threshold and no out-going ones, together with zero stage-payo¤s
may do the trick of incorporating an Allee e¤ect as well. Further research
should also show whether time lags might assist in approximating the real-
life phenomena aimed at here, more closely. Finally, splitting populations
up into cohorts with di¤erent levels of fecundity, with the most fertile ones
being hunted, may be another addition to the model worth exploring.
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